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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890456 
v. : 
GEORGE WESLEY HAMILTON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The two issues presented in this petition for rehearing 
are: 
1. What standard of review will this Court apply to a 
trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rules 
404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
2. Did this Court find that it was error for the trial 
court to admit testimony of prior violent acts? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On appeal from a second trial, this Court affirmed 
defendant's conviction. One of defendant's claims on appeal was 
"that the trial court erred in permitting the State to adduce 
testimony during its direct examination of . . . [defendant's] 
live-in girlfriend, that [defendant] had physically abused her 
prior to the time [the victim] was killed." State v. Hamilton, 
Case No. 890456, slip op. at 9 (Utah Nov. 22, 1991) (a copy of 
the full opinion is attached as an addendum)• As the standard of 
review for this claim, this Court stated: 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under rules 404(b) 
and 403, [Utah Rules of Evidence,] we will 
not overturn the court's determination unless 
it was an abuse of discretion* See State v. 
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); rState 
v, 1Verde, 770 P.2d [116,] 120 [(Utah 1989)]. 
Hamilton, slip op. at 11. 
Also referring to the claim about evidence of prior 
violent acts, this Court said: 
As to the third claim, although the trial 
court erred in admitting evidence of 
Hamilton's prior violent act during the 
State's direct examination, we find the error 
harmless. 
Id., slip op. at 1. Subsequently, after citing the standard of 
review, the Court said: 
Under the above-stated standard of review, 
only prejudicial errors in admitting evidence 
are subject to reversal. . . . On the facts 
of this case, therefore, we need not 
determine definitively whether the evidence 
was admitted improperly, because we conclude 
that any error in its admission was harmless. 
Id., slip op. at 11 (citations omitted). Finally, in conclusion, 
the Court stated: 
Because we conclude that the error is 
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
substantial likelihood that the outcome would 
have been different absent admission of this 
evidence on direct examination, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Id., slip op. at 12. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart 
stated that he did not believe the admission of evidence of prior 
violent acts was error; consequently, he thought "the majority's 
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application of the harmless error doctrine [was] superfluous." 
Id., slip op. at 13. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in 
the Statement of the Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court's use of the abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing the trial court's ruling admitting evidence of prior 
violent acts appears to revert to a terminology termed 
"inappropriate" by this Court in State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 16, n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991). This petition seeks 
clarification of the use of that standard of review and 
terminology. 
The majority of the Court expressly stated that it 
"need not determine" whether admission of the prior acts evidence 
was error, and yet it twice refers to the admission as error. 
This petition seeks clarification of the issue of whether the 
trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. Utah R. 
App. P. 35(a). The petition for rehearing is properly before the 
Court and should be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S 
ADMISSIBILITY CLAIM EY CITING TO STATE V, 
RAMIREZ, 159 UTAH ADV. REP. 7 (UTAH APRIL 23, 
1991), WHICH EXPLAINED EARLIER DECISIONS 
ABOUT THE STANDARD. 
In reviewing defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred by admitting testimony by defendant's girlfriend of prior 
violent acts against her, this Court applied the abuse of 
discretion standard found in State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 
(Utah 1989),and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
In doing so, this Court made no reference to its lengthy review 
of that standard in State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16, 
n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991). In Ramirez, this Court stated: 
[A] closer inspection of [earlier] cases 
reveals that the "abuse of discretion" 
terminology is used inappropriately. Whether 
a piece of evidence is admissible is a 
question of law, and we always review 
questions of law under a correctness 
standard. . . . 
When viewed closely, the cited cases 
appear actually to have applied this 
standard. The confusion is rooted in the 
fact that on occasion, the legal standard for 
admissibility of evidence vests a measure of 
discretion in the trial court. For example, 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 requires that a 
trial court balance the probativeness of a 
piece of evidence against its potential for 
unfair prejudice; if the potential for unfair 
prejudice outweighs the probativeness, the 
evidence is excludable as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial court initially 
performs that balancing. If it concludes 
that the evidence is admissible, we review 
that decision for correctness. But in 
deciding whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law, we de facto grant it some 
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discretion, because we reverse only if we 
conclude that it acted unreasonably in 
striking the balance. . . . If we conclude 
that the trial court erred, we may 
characterize that ruling as "an abuse of 
discretion," but in reality, we have found 
that the court committed legal error and that 
the unfairly prejudicial potential of the 
evidence outweighs its probativeness. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, n.3. Confusion arises because the 
Court cited to the earlier Larson and Verde decisions for 
applying the "abuse of discretion" standard, without reference to 
subsequent explanation of that standard given in Ramirez. Is the 
Court reverting back to the facially more deferential standard of 
the earlier cases? While petitioner does not believe that that 
is the direction the Court is taking, the use of earlier cases 
for the standard, coupled with no mention of Ramirez, creates 
confusion. Therefore, the Court should modify its opinion to 
clarify the standard of review. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER IT 
DETERMINED THAT ADMISSION OF PRIOR VIOLENT 
ACTS WAS ERROR. 
In the opening and concluding paragraphs of the 
majority opinion in this case, the Court referred to the trial 
court's admission of evidence of defendant's prior violent acts 
as error. Hamilton, slip op. at 1 and 12. However, in analyzing 
the issue, the majority wrote: 
On the facts of this case, therefore, we need 
not determine definitively whether the 
evidence was admitted improperly, because we 
conclude that any error in its admission was 
harmless. 
-5-
Id,, slip op. at 11 (citations omitted). In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Stewart opined that admission of the evidence 
was not error and consequently, the harraless error analysis was 
"superfluous." id.., slip op. at 13. Justice Stewart concluded 
that the evidence of prior violent acts was admissible because 
"it was highly relevant to explain [the witness's] alibi 
stories." .Id. (citing generally State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 
(Utah 1987)). 
Petitioner urges this Court to adopt the view of 
Justice Stewart that there was no error in admission of the 
evidence. Alternatively, if the Court "need not determine 
definitively whether the evidence was admitted improperly," .id.. , 
slip op. at 11, petitioner requests that the Court delete the 
references to the admission as being error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform to more recent 
pronouncements of Utah law on the issue of the standard of 
review, and to be internally consistent on the issue of whether 
the trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence. 
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The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ti day of December, 
1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing petition for rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to G. Fred Metos, Hatch, McCaughey & Metos, Attorneys 
for Defendant, 72 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this S— day of December, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
State of Utah, No. 890456 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
F I L E D 
v. November 22, 1991 
George Wesley Hamilton, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Fourth District, Millard County 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant George Wesley Hamilton appeals his 
conviction of second degree murder, a first degree felony. 
Hamilton raises three claims of error: (i) insufficiency of 
the evidence to support the conviction; (ii) failure to 
instruct the jury on the nature and effect of fingerprint 
evidence; and (iii) improper admission of evidence concerning 
other violent acts by Hamilton- With regard to Hamilton's 
first two claims, we find no error. As to the third claim, 
although the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
Hamilton's prior violent act during the State's direct 
examination/ we find the error harmless. We therefore affirm 
Hamilton's conviction. 
In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1837 
(1990); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). We 
recite the facts accordingly. Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 
1156, 1158 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 
(Utah 1989). 
Sharon L. Sant was a student at Southern Utah State 
College in Cedar City, Utah, during the summer of 1985. 
Around the end of July 1985, Sant told a friend, Cheryl Cox, 
that she intended to return to her hometown of Fillmore, Utah, 
to attend the funeral services of some high school friends. 
On August 1, after failing to obtain other transportation, 
Sant started to hitchhike from Cedar City to Fillmore. One of 
Sant's co-workers, Royce Barton, saw her at approximately 
11:45 a.m. at a northbound on-ramp of Interstate 15 in Cedar 
City. She never arrived in Fillmore. Cox reported Sant 
missing on August 6, 1985. 
Beginning in March 1985, defendant George Wesley 
Hamilton worked for Arnold Foch Parkinson on a ranch Parkinson 
leased north of Paragonah, Utah. Paragonah is twenty-two 
miles north of Cedar City on 1-15, between Cedar City and 
Fillmore. Hamilton's co-worker on the ranch was Robert Bott. 
In early July, Hamilton stopped working full time for 
Parkinson. He then split his time between cutting firewood in 
the Paragonah area and working on the ranch. He continued to 
alternate between ranch work and woodcutting into early 1986. 
On the morning of August 1, 1985, the owner of the 
ranch could not find Hamilton, Bott, or Parkinson on the 
ranch. Later that afternoon, while shopping at the M&D Market 
in Parowan, Utah, five miles north of Paragonah along 1-15, 
Jacklyn Smith saw Hamilton and Bott in the store's parking 
lot. She saw Bott and a woman later identified as Sant seated 
in the cab of Hamilton's flatbed truck. She also saw Hamilton 
leave the store with a twelve-can pack of Budweiser beer, put 
the beer in the back of the truck, and then get into the 
driver's side of the truck cab. Hamilton, Bott, and Sant then 
drove away. 
On August 16, 1985, a Utah Department of 
Transportation employee working near a frontage road and a 
northbound on-ramp of 1-15 at Cove Fort, Utah, noticed some 
curious marks leading away from the road into some scrub 
trees. Upon investigation, he and two co-workers determined 
that they were drag marks. They followed the marks and 
discovered a small mound of dirt that had "sticks and an oily 
residue coming up through the dirt [to the] top of the 
mound." After the workers noticed what appeared to be a dried 
intestine on top of the mound, they left the area undisturbed 
and contacted police. 
Officers of the Millard County Sheriffs Office 
arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The officers opened 
the mound and found the unclothed, mutilated remains of a 
female. Both hands, feet, and breasts, the head, and the left 
arm had been removed. The left arm was in the grave between 
the legs of the torso. The body had been cut open from the 
breast bone to the pubic bone and the uterus and other sexual 
organs apparently had been removed. Sometime later, officers 
assisted by a canine team discovered breast tissue under a 
bush some thirty-nine feet from the grave. The deputy who 
discovered the tissue testified that there was "grease or a 
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skid mark" about two feet long that led under the bush. "It 
was like the rolling of the dirt as if the item had struck the 
ground and skidded up underneath the bush." The other missing 
body parts were never recovered. 
About seventy-five feet from the grave site, officers 
located a wood-splitting maul. The officers testified that 
the maul had been used in excavating the shallow grave. The 
maul carried traces of blood at the base of the metal head, on 
the wooden portion at the top of the head, and on the bottom 
of the handle. Investigators were unable to determine the 
blood type because there was an insufficient quantity of 
blood. The officers were likewise unable to recover 
fingerprints from the handle of the maul. Testimony at trial 
indicated that Ronald Frank Johnson, owner of a Parowan 
service station at which Hamilton was a regular customer, had 
seen a similar maul in Hamilton's truck in July 1985. Johnson 
further testified that in November 1985, he had noticed that a 
similar, but newer, maul had replaced the one he had seen in 
July. 
In addition to the maul, officers recovered a 
considerable amount of physical evidence from the crime scene, 
including blood stains and hair recovered from gravel at the 
edge of the roadway. The hair was found to be similar to 
samples of Sant's hair taken from her hair brush and 
clothing. Similar hair was also found in Hamilton's truck. 
In addition, the two-hundred-foot drag trail, which began at 
the road and ended at the grave, was spotted in numerous 
places with type O-positive human blood. Both Sant and 
Hamilton had this blood type. Specifically, officers 
recovered blood samples from stained soil and tree and 
sagebrush branches along the drag trail. Police testified 
that one area of the drag trail, which they called the 
•'mutilation point," was particularly "covered with blood." 
Near this point, officers found a piece of cardboard with 
blood on it and a blood-stained beer bottle in the bushes. 
There were two bloody fingerprints on the bottle—one on the 
outside and one just inside the neck. The fingerprint on the 
outside was identified as Hamilton's. Although the other 
fingerprint had a whorl similar to one of Hamilton's, it did 
not have enough detail to positively identify it as his. 
Evidence showed that the beer bottle was manufactured between 
September and December of 1979. It would have been shipped to 
the bottler within thirty days of manufacture and filled and 
shipped immediately to the distributor. 
Officers also collected five Budweiser cans near the 
drag trail. They lifted four latent fingerprints from two of 
the cans. Two of Hamilton's fingerprints were found on one 
can. Another of Hamilton's prints and a print of a man 
identified as Michael Perry were found on the second can. 
Evidence showed that three of the five beer cans were filled 
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on July 2, 1985, and possibly were packaged together. The can 
with two of Hamilton's prints was one of these three. A 
fourth can, which had no identifiable prints, was packaged on 
July 1, 1985. The fifth can, which had the fingerprints of 
Hamilton and Perry, was packaged August 5, 1985. A Budweiser 
representative testified that Budweiser cans packed in a 
twelve-pack purchased from the M&D Market in Parowan on 
August 1st were packaged on July 1 and 2, 1985. 
Dr. Edwin Sweeney, acting state medical examiner, 
examined the remains of the body. Through comparison of X-ray 
records, Dr. Sweeney identified the remains as Sanfs. He 
testified that the marks on the body were consistent with the 
removal of the head, hands, feet, and one arm with a blunt 
instrument, such as the wood-splitting maul found at the 
scene. He also testified that the incision in the torso was 
made with a sharp instrument such as a knife and that the 
incisions around the breasts were made with the same type of 
instrument. Although Dr. Sweeney testified that the presence 
of blood and hair samples that appeared "somewhat squashed or 
stuck" in the gravel near the road implied that the victim had 
suffered a blow to the head, he was unable to determine the 
cause of death or whether the incisions and mutilation of the 
body occurred before or after death without the head. The 
decomposition of the body, however, was consistent with Sanfs 
dying on August 1st. 
On January 29, 1986, an anonymous informant 
telephoned police and said that Hamilton might have 
participated in the Sant murder. After several weeks of 
investigation, both Hamilton and Bott were arrested and 
charged with first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. 
The prosecutor granted Bott immunity, and he was never tried. 
Hamilton, on the other hand, was eventually tried on an 
amended information which charged second degree murder, 
aggravated sexual assault, and forcible sexual abuse. 
Hamilton was convicted of second degree murder; the aggravated 
sexual assault and sexual abuse charges were dismissed. 
Because of jury misconduct, the trial court set aside the 
conviction and ordered a new trial on the second degree murder 
charge. After the second trial, the new jury panel found 
Hamilton guilty of second degree murder. Hamilton appeals his 
conviction from the second trial. 
Hamilton makes three claims of error: first, that 
there was insufficient evidence that he participated in the 
murder of Sharon Sant; second, that the trial court erred when 
it refused to instruct the jury that before it could consider 
the fingerprint evidence against Hamilton, it must determine 
that the fingerprints at the scene were left at the time of 
the murder; and finally, that the trial court erred when it 
allowed the State to introduce evidence of his specific acts 
of violence against a witness who was not a victim of the 
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crime with which he was charged. On the first point, Hamilton 
argues that the verdict should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court with an order that a judgment 
of acquittal be entered. On the second and third points, he 
contends that the judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. We will consider each of Hamilton's 
claims separately. 
We note the standard for review applicable to 
Hamilton's first claim. When a jury verdict is challenged on 
the ground that the evidence is insufficient, our scrutiny of 
the evidence is limited: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); accord State v. 
Vjtr££, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); State v. McCardell. 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). We will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (Utah 1980) . 
Hamilton points out that all the evidence used to 
convict him is circumstantial. Although he recognizes that a 
number of pieces of circumstantial evidence link him to Sant 
and the burial scene, the thrust of his insufficiency claim is 
that the only real evidence against him is the fingerprint 
evidence recovered from the bottle and the cans at the burial 
site. He relies on cases from other jurisdictions for the 
proposition that fingerprint evidence alone, especially when 
found on movable objects commonly located in places accessible 
to the public, is insufficient to support a conviction unless 
it can be shown that the fingerprints were left at the time 
and place of the commission of the crime. See United States 
v, CorSP, 439 F.2d 956, 957 (4th Cir. 1971); Sorev v. Stat*. 
419 So. 2d 810, 812-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Fladuna v. 
State, 4 Md. App. 664, 668-69, 244 A.2d 909, 911 (1968); 
Commonwealth v. Cichv, 227 Pa. Super. 480, 483, 323 A.2d 817, 
818-19 (1974). Essentially, he argues that the evidence here 
is insufficient because it does not exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis that the fingerprints might have been left at a 
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time or place other than when and where the crime was 
committed.1 
Hamilton's interpretation of the facts and law 
relative to the fingerprint evidence is incorrect. We first 
address the law. There are two general approaches to the 
weight that may be afforded fingerprint evidence. The first, 
which is based on an American Law Reports annotation, views 
fingerprint evidence with skepticism: "To warrant a 
conviction, the fingerprints corresponding to those of the 
accused must have been found in the place where the crime was 
committed under such circumstances that they could only have 
been impressed at the time when the crime was committed." 
Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as 
Evidence, 28 A.L.R,2d § 29, at 1154 (1953); see also Borum v. 
United States, 380 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D,C. Cir. 1967); State v. 
Burton, 144 Ariz. 248, 252-53, 697 P.2d 331, 335-36 (1985); 
McNeil v. State, 227 Md. 298, 300, 176 A.2d 338, 339 (1961); 
Reed v. State, 95 Nev. 190, 194, 591 P.2d 274, 276 (1979); 
Knight v. State, 185 Ga. App. 619, 622, 365 S.E.2d 484, 486-87 
(1988)- In addition, where only fingerprint evidence links 
the defendant to the crime, such evidence is insufficient to 
support a conviction, Borum, 380 F.2d at 596-97, 
Some jurisdictions apply a variant of the first 
approach. While purporting to follow the A.L.R./£jQ_rum 
approach, they actually have modified it in practice. They 
appear to follow A.L.R./Borum only when questionable 
fingerprint evidence is the only evidence inculpating the 
defendant. See Corso, 439 F.2d at 957. In instances where 
additional evidence supports the conviction, these courts 
generally treat fingerprint evidence as they do other 
circumstantial evidence. They allow the trier of fact to 
determine the weight it is to be given. See, e.g., United 
States v. Talbert, 710 F,2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. 
1. With regard to the "no reasonable alternative hypothesis" 
theory upon which defendant proceeds, we note that this court 
has previously indicated that this is only one way of stating 
the prosecution's burden of proof, which requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eaale, 611 P.2d 1211, 
1213 (Utah 1980). Such an instruction need not be given in 
these terms in every circumstantial evidence case. Jji. In 
the present case, the trial court did give a "no reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" instruction. 
We also note that although a jury can convict only upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the 
charged crime, on appeal, we need not be convinced in our own 
minds beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we must uphold the 
jury verdict unless reasonable minds could not have found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. 
Verde, 770 P.2d at 444; BPPKer, 709 P.2d at 345; State v. 
Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
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denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); United States v. Phillips, 664 
F.2d 971, 1033 (5th Cir. 1981), cert, denied sub nom. 
Meinster v. United States. 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United 
States v. Harris. 530 F.2d 576, 579 (4th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Bonds, 526 F.2d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 843 (1976); United States v. Roustio, 455 
F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Scarce!lino, 
431 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1970). 
The second approach treats fingerprint evidence like 
any other piece of circumstantial evidence whether or not 
there is additional evidence. For example, in Mason v. 
Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1962), the court observed: 
It has been stated as the general rule 
that fingerprints alone will support a 
conviction only if they are found in the 
place where the crime was committed "under 
such circumstances that they could only 
have been impressed at the time when the 
crime was committed." To accept this 
choice of words would, it seems to us, 
refute the oft-repeated rule in this state 
that "if there is any evidence, however 
slight or circumstantial, which tends to 
show guilt of the crime charged or any of 
its degrees, it is the trial court's duty 
to submit the case to the jury." 
Id. at 668 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Bruce v. 
State, 268 Ind. 180, 257-58, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1082-83, cert, 
denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Wilcox v. State, 356 So. 2d 887, 
889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds. 367 
So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1979); People v. Willis, 60 Mich. App. 154, 
158-59, 230 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Ct. App. 1975). This latter 
approach is in line with Utah case law. We have always 
treated fingerprint evidence like any other evidence and have 
never evaluated its sufficiency to support a conviction by a 
separate, more stringent standard. See State v. Bailey, 712 
P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985); State v. Jollev, 571 P.2d 582, 585 
(Utah 1977); In re Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Washington, 17 Utah 2d 149, 150, 405 P.2d 793, 793 
(1965). 
Hamilton urges that we follow A.L.R./fioxum and treat 
fingerprint evidence as though it is subject to reliability 
problems similar to those that affect eyewitness 
identification evidence. Science has shown eyewitness 
identification testimony to have inherent weaknesses that 
almost universally are unappreciated by jurors. Fingerprint 
evidence, however, presents no analogous accuracy problems. 
Questions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint 
evidence are fairly obvious and straightforward and are 
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subject to complete illumination through cross-examination and 
jury argument. Thus, we find no reason to conclude that 
fingerprint evidence differs from any other circumstantial 
evidence. The jury can weigh it with the rest of the evidence 
in determining a defendant's guilt. 
In the present case, when the fingerprint evidence is 
considered along with all the other evidence linking Hamilton 
to Sant and the crime scene, it is apparent that there was 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Hamilton had participated in the murder 
of Sharon Sant. 
Closely related to Hamilton's insufficiency of the 
evidence claim is his second contention, i.e., that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give an instruction on the nature 
and effect of fingerprint evidence. 
We first address the standard by which jury 
instruction rulings are reviewed. A trial court has a duty to 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the 
case. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). The 
defendant has a right "to have his [or her] theory of the case 
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Id. 
at 78; see also State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 
1985). However, a trial court can refuse to give an 
instruction that misstates the law. State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988); State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 75, 
498 P.2d 357, 359 (1972). And it "is not error to refuse a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the 
other instructions." State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 
(Utah 1982); Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d at 75, 498 P.2d at 359. 
Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury 
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness, Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 
(Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). 
The proposed fingerprint instruction the trial court 
declined to give essentially states that the jury cannot 
consider evidence of Hamilton's fingerprints on the cans and 
bottle unless the jury first finds that there is no possibility 
that Hamilton left the prints at a time other than during the 
commission of the crime.2 Hamilton contends that this 
2. Hamilton's proposed instruction is as follows: 
The state has offered circumstantial 
evidence in the nature of fingerprints in 
this case. You are instructed to consider 
this evidence along with all other evidence 
in making your determination of whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
(Continued on page 9.) 
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instruction was required because the fingerprint evidence 
might have misled the jury. Specifically, Hamilton contends 
that the fact that the prints were found at the scene of the 
crime might lead the jury to give them undue weight and to 
discount the fact that they were found on movable articles 
located in an area easily accessible to the public. In 
essence, Hamilton argues for a special cautionary instruction 
on fingerprint evidence analogous to the instruction we have 
required when eyewitness identification testimony is presented 
in a case. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986); 
see also State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 10 (1991). 
Because we have held that fingerprint evidence is not entitled 
to special treatment, the trial court did not err when it 
refused to give Hamilton's proposed instruction.3 
Turning to the final claim on appeal, Hamilton argues 
that the trial court erred in permitting the State to adduce 
testimony during its direct examination of Rita Weatherby, 
Hamilton's live-in girlfriend, that Hamilton had physically 
abused her prior to the time Sant was killed. Hamilton argues 
that this evidence violated rule 404 of the rules of evidence 
in that it allowed evidence of Hamilton's character that had 
no other evidentiary purpose but to show that Hamilton acted 
in conformity to his character. Hamilton also argues that the 
evidence was more prejudicial than probative under rule 403. 
(Footnote 2 continued.) 
offense as charged in the information. 
However, before you may find the defendant 
guilty on the basis of fingerprint 
evidence, you must find that the print was 
made at the time of the incident for which 
the defendant is charged. However, if the 
circumstances are such that the print 
could have been impressed at a time other 
than that of the incident for which the 
defendant is charged, then you are not to 
consider the fingerprint evidence with 
respect to the defendant's guilt. The 
circumstances to consider in determining 
whether the print was impressed when the 
crime was committed include, but are not 
limited to, the location of the print, the 
character of the place or premises where 
the print was found and whether the object 
would be inaccessible to the defendant 
except in the commission of the crime. 
3. This does not imply that it is error for a trial court to 
give a cautionary instruction about fingerprint evidence, or 
any other type of evidence, where the prosecution's case is 
entirely circumstantial. We do not understand Justice Stewart 
to disagree on this point. 
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Before the examination that resulted in Weatherby's 
statements, the court held an in camera hearing on the 
testimony's admissibility. The State proffered evidence that 
Weatherby would testify that on three different occasions she 
had given police inconsistent statements concerning 
Hamilton's whereabouts on August 1, 1985. Her testimony 
would be that she had told police on two occasions that she 
was with Hamilton on August 1st. During a third interview 
with police, she said that she was not with Hamilton on 
August 1st and that she had lied earlier about being with 
him. The State proferred that Weatherby would say she had 
lied earlier because Hamilton had asked her to provide him 
with an alibi for August 1st and she had agreed to give it 
because she was afraid of him. She would testify that she 
was afraid of Hamilton because he had hit her during the time 
she lived with him. 
Hamilton objected on two grounds to the admission of 
the evidence that he had struck Weatherby. First, he 
contended that the evidence was offered to prove that his 
killing Sant would be consistent with proof that violence 
against women was part of his basic character. Such evidence 
as to character is not admissible under rule 404(b). That 
rule requires that for the evidence of specific acts to be 
admissible, it must have some purpose other than proof that 
the charges against the defendant are consistent with his 
character, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The second ground for 
objecting to the evidence's admissibility was the likelihood 
that it would be unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded 
under rule 403. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
The court overruled both objections. As to the 
404(b) objection, the court reasoned that the evidence was 
admissible because "it is a direct statement relative to the 
very issue in the case here and relevant to a description of 
and actions of the defendant as it relates to his being a 
suspect in the homicide that is here being investigated." 
Regarding the 403 objection, the court said: 
Now, as far as the prejudicial effect and 
as far as it being a specific instance of 
bad conduct—being assaultive—it is not an 
independent or an isolated one* This is 
one related to the very witness who could 
or could not provide him with what he 
wanted by way of an alibi, and his actions 
pertaining to his enforcement of that 
request. So that would not fall within the 
rule that you're citing there, and the 
court would deny the motion on that ground. 
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The evidence was then admitted. Although it is difficult to 
determine the precise basis for the admission of the evidence, 
it appears that the court found there was an independent basis 
for admission of the evidence outside of the specific 
exceptions listed in rule 404(b), namely, that it established 
that defendant was attempting to create a false alibi, a fact 
that raises an inference of an admission of culpability. The 
court also found that the probativeness of this evidence was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under rules 404(b) and 403, we will 
not overturn the court's determination unless it was an abuse 
of discretion. See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
1989); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. 
Under the above-stated standard of review, only 
prejudicial errors in admitting evidence are subject to 
reversal. Therefore, even if we were to assume that the 
evidence here was improperly admitted as part of the State's 
case because it constituted improper bolstering of the 
prosecution's witness during the presentation of the State's 
case-in-chief and before the defense attacked the credibility 
of the witness, that would not satisfy the abuse-of-discretion 
standard. We would still have to consider whether the error 
was prejudicial. On the facts of this case, therefore, we 
need not determine definitively whether the evidence was 
admitted improperly, because we conclude that any error in its 
admission was harmless. Larson, 775 P.2d at 419; Verde, 770 
P.2d at 120. 
••Harmless" errors are -errors which, although 
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120; Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ, P. 61. Although it 
is somewhat difficult to state exactly when an error is such 
that it would result in a "reasonable likelihood" of a 
different result, we have attempted to give a more concrete 
definition of such an error in State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1987), where we held, "For an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Idt at 920. 
Here, the error is not one that undermines our confidence in 
the verdict. 
In making this determination, we consider a host of 
factors including, among others, the importance of the 
witness's testimony to the prosecution's case and the overall 
strength of the State's case. £££ State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 
200, 205 (Utah 1987). The more evidence supporting the 
verdict, the less likely there was harmful error, ifl. Here, 
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the evidence consisted of testimony that Hamilton had been 
abusive to a woman on a prior occasion. It came during Rita 
Weatherby's testimony while explaining why she had lied about 
being with Hamilton on August 1, 1985. Clearly, evidence that 
Hamilton had acted violently towards a woman on a previous 
occasion was damaging evidence, and if it were the only 
evidence or one of the only pieces of evidence before the 
jury, we might well consider it so prejudicial as to undermine 
our confidence in the verdict. That is not the case here. 
Weatherby's statement, in the context of the entire case, is 
not so significant that it should be afforded great weight, 
especially when viewed against all the other evidence linking 
Hamilton to Sant and the burial site. 
Because we conclude that the error is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no substantial likelihood that 
the outcome would have been different absent admission of this 
evidence on direct examination, we affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
STEWART. Justice: (Concurring) 
In my view, the trial court properly rejected the 
defendant's proposed instruction with respect to the weight 
the jury could give to the fingerprint evidence because the 
fingerprint evidence was not the only evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime and, more important, because the 
proposed instruction could have given the jurors the 
impression that they should consider only the fingerprint 
evidence on that point. On the facts of this case, the 
instruction could have been confusing and misleading. 
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Nevertheless, an instruction on fingerprint evidence 
along the lines of that proposed by the defendant may well be 
appropriate, or even mandatory, when there is no other 
significant evidence pertaining to identity. For example, if 
the only evidence linking a defendant to a crime is 
fingerprint evidence and ambiguous circumstantial evidence as 
to when the fingerprint was impressed, an instruction would be 
appropriate and, perhaps, required. 
In addition, I do not believe that the admission of 
Rita Weatherby's statement that the defendant had hit her, 
made in the context of explaining why she had changed the 
alibi story that she had given to the police, was error. This 
Court has been careful to require that prior crime evidence 
have special relevance to the facts of the case, and I 
certainly do not suggest departing from that fundamental rule 
of fairness. Nevertheless, in this case, I believe that the 
statement was within our rules allowing for admissibility 
since it was highly relevant to explain Weatherby's alibi 
stories. See generally State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 
1987). In my view, the majority's application of the harmless 
error doctrine is superfluous. 
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